Ministerial responsibility is the cornerstone

take careial responsibility is the cornerstoneIn medieval times, the royal provide was signified in documents bearing royal seal and was applied by one of the Kings ministers. Maitland has described this practice as being the foundation for our modernistic-day doctrine of ministerial responsibility that for every exercise of the royal power whatever minister is answerable1. This essay will consider the modern doctrine of ministerial responsibility and examine the extent to which it forms, in modern political times, the cornerstone of function in the UK organic law.The convention of ministerial responsibility has been described by Loveland as perhaps the most important non-legal rule within our constitution2. The convention may be verbalise to be concerned with regulating the place of g everyplacenment activities, both in respect of Ministers relations with each other, and with the two Houses of parliament3. ministerial responsibility comprises of two branches collective responsibility and mortal responsibility4. corporate ministerial responsibility may be further reduced into three main rules the confidence rule the unanimity rule, and the confidentiality rule5. Through the operation of these rules, Ministers of the political sympathies solely emerge to others to share the same policy opinions, whatever their own personal views. They are therefore collectively responsible for any decisions made by the G overnment and the Government as a whole should resign if it loses confidence. The doctrine of collective responsibility was stated in 2005 in the following formCollective responsibility requires that Ministers should be able to express their views frankly in the expectation that they can argue freely in private while maintaining a united front when decisions construct been reached. This in turn requires that the privacy of opinions expressed in Cabinet and Ministerial Committees should be maintained.6It therefore follows that where a Minister does not wish to be in public accountable to Parliament and the electorate for a Governmental decision, he should resign from the Government. This occurred, for example, when Robin Cooke resigned over the Labour Governments decision to invade Iraq in 20037.Collective ministerial responsibility allows all members of Government to be accountable as a whole, thus avoiding arguments and blame-shifting between different Ministers and Departments. In this way, collective responsibility enhances the accountability of Government.Individual ministerial responsibility is the convention that a Minister answers to Parliament for his incision, with praise and blame being addressed to the minister and not civil servants8. It has been said that the fundamental purpose of the convention of individual ministerial responsibility is that it provides an important means of drawing entropy into the public domain9 The principle has often been associated with the supposition that ministers essential r esign in cases of official wrongdoing10 but it also encompasses Ministers on-going obligations to account to Parliament for their departments work11.However, in 2000, Jowell and Oliver suggested that ministerial responsibility to Parliament had been significantly weakened over the last ten years or so so that it can no longer be said, in our view, that it is a fundamental doctrine of the constitution12. Their opinion may have been influenced by the structural changes in government. During the 20th century tasks of the state expanded and vast Whitehall departments were created, with the effect that ministers could not oversee all aspects of the departments work13. Executive Next Steps agencies created since 1988 had the specific purpose of delegating managerial power. Indeed, as Turner states Ministerial responsibility, however, is a different matter in the modern era. It has shrunk, it seems, almost to nothing, thanks, in no small part, to the creation of independent agencies to und ertake the work of government.14Where civil servants have great authority, the question arises as to what extent a Minister is responsible for any acts of maladministration, and whether maladministration results in a duty to resign. Is it fair to hold the Minister responsible? If not, who should be and how does this affect accountability?As Tomkins notes, during the major(ip) Governments office from 1990 to 1997 Ministers and senior civil servants proposed a number of initiatives that sought significantly to undermine the tenets of individual responsibility15. It was claimed that Ministers were responsible only for those decisions in which they were directly and personally involved. Michael Howard claimed, after serious failings leading to Prison escapes, that Ministers were responsible to Parliament only for policy matters, with operational failings falling outside the scope of individual responsibility16. Furthermore, it was argued that where Ministers had misled Parliament, they should resign only if they had done so knowingly rather than inadvertently17.In this way Ministerial responsibility was weakened, with accountability becoming more prominent. A minister may be said to be accountable to Parliament for everything which occurs in a department, having a duty to inform Parliament about the policies and decision of the department and to announce when something has gone wrong. However, this does not bring with it responsibility in the sense that the Minister takes the blame.In 1997 the Ministerial Code reformulated ministerial responsibility to the effect thatMinisters must uphold the principle of collective responsibility (b) Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies, decisions and actions of their departments and agencies (c) it is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament will be expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister (d) Ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament, refusing to provide information only when disclosure would not be in the public interest (e) Ministers should likewise require civil servants who give evidence before Parliamentary Committees on their behalf and under their direction to be as helpful as possible in providing accurate, truthful and full information18This new formulation would suggest that it is now ministerial accountability rather than responsibility which forms the cornerstone of accountability in the UK constitution. Unless there is fully open Government, there may be situations which arise where no person will take responsibility for actions and Ministers relationship with the Civil Service will be fundamentally changed. As Hennessy points out For the Civil Service the buck-stopping question is of crucial importance. Under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, mi nisters are the ultimate can-carriers for everything done by the civil service in their name19. This will no longer be the case where a Ministers responsibility ends with alerting Parliament to a problem. BibliographyAllen, M. Thompson, B., Cases and Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law, 9th Edition, (2008), OUPBamforth, N., Political accountability in play the Budd Inquiry and David Blunketts resignation, (2005), Public Law, 229Bradley, A.W. Ewing, K.D., Constitutional and Administrative Law, fourteenth Edition (2007), Pearson LongmanBrazier, R., It is a Constitutional Issue Fitness for Ministerial theatrical role in the 1990s, (1994), Public Law, 431Cooke, R., The Point of Departure (2003), Simon and SchusterHansard, HC cols 31-46 (January 10, 1995)Hennessy, P., Whitehall, (1989), Secker WarburgHough, B., Ministerial responses to parliamentary questions some recent concerns, (2003), Public Law, 211Jowell, J. Oliver, D., The Changing Constitution, fourth Edition , (2000), OUPLewis, N. Longley, D., Ministerial Responsibility The Next Steps, (1996), Public Law, 490Loveland, I., Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights A Critical Introduction, 4th Edition, (2006), OUP,Maitland, Constitutional History,Marshall, G., Constitutional Conventions, (1984)Ministerial Code a Code of Ethics and Procedural Guidance for Ministers (reissued, July 2005)Tomkins, A., The Constitution after Scott Government Unwrapped, (1998), ClarendonTomkins, A., Public Law, (2003), OUPTurner, A., Losing heads over the anomic data, (2007), 171, Justice of the Peace, 8411Footnotes1 Maitland, Constitutional History, pg 2032 Loveland, I., Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights A Critical Introduction, 4th Edition, (2006), OUP, pg 3063 Loveland, ibid, pg 3064 Allen, M. Thompson, B., Cases and Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law, 9th Edition, (2008), OUP, pg 2515 Marshall, G., Constitutional Conventions, (1984), pg 55-566 Ministe rial Code a Code of Ethics and Procedural Guidance for Ministers (reissued, July 2005), para 6.177 Cooke, R., The Point of Departure, pg 1158 Bradley, A.W. Ewing, K.D., Constitutional and Administrative Law, 14th Edition (2007), Pearson Longman, pg 1149 Hough, B., Ministerial responses to parliamentary questions some recent concerns, (2003), Public Law, 21110 See e.g. Lewis, N. Longley, D., Ministerial Responsibility The Next Steps, (1996), Public Law, 490 Brazier, R., It is a Constitutional Issue Fitness for Ministerial Office in the 1990s, (1994), Public Law, 43111 Bamforth, N., Political accountability in play the Budd Inquiry and David Blunketts resignation, (2005), Public Law, 22912 Jowell, J. Oliver, D., The Changing Constitution, 4th Edition, (2000), OUP, p. viii13 Bradley Ewing, ibid, pg 11414 Turner, A., Losing heads over the lost data, (2007), 171, Justice of the Peace, 84115 Tomkins, A., Public Law, (2003), OUP, pg 140-14116 Hansard, HC cols 31-46 (January 10, 1995)17 Tomkins, A., The Constitution after Scott Government Unwrapped, (1998), Clarendon, pg 41-4518 HC Deb, 19 March 1997, col 104619 Hennessy, P., Whitehall, (1989), Secker Warburg, pg 502